KIERKEGAARD AND NATURAL REASON:
A CATHOLIC ENCOUNTER
Jack Mulder, Jr.
https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2345&context=faithandphilosophy
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous attacks on natural theology's attempts to prove God's existence only go so far. So long as there is an acceptable epistemological option available to ground our awareness of the principles that undergird the premises of demonstrative arguments, and I have argued that there is, then some demonstrative arguments may in fact prove God's existence with certainty by natural reason (so long as natural reason is properly understood). In fact, it has been argued elsewhere72 that Kierkegaard himself accepts some aspects of the epistemological picture that would make this possible.
Further, Kierkegaard and the Catholic tradition appear to share a sense that the knowledge of God's existence should be available to all, independently of whether these have the acumen for digesting complex demonstrative arguments. There are strong parallels to aspects of Kierkegaard's work that can be found in Newman's understanding of conscience, and in Rahneh s notion of transcendental knowledge of God. All of this would seem to be a natural knowledge quite independent of a particular revelation by God. Kierkegaard and the Catholic tradition can also be mutually reinforcing on the issue of non-culpable atheism. There are resources in both for implicit theism in the face of explicit atheism, especially when considering the voice of moral conscience. In addition, the phenomenon of social sin in the Catholic tradition may indicate an advance upon Kierkegaard's thought on this issue, but Kierkegaard's depth in probing human despair can be helpful in imagining cases of what we might, following Evans, call "motivated atheism." In some cases, the motivation is understandable, but it is not ultimately, an "excuse.
º» ³í¹®¿¡¼ ³ª´Â ½ÅÀÇ Á¸À縦 Áõ¸íÇÏ·Á´Â ÀÚ¿¬½ÅÇÐÀÇ ½Ãµµ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£ÀÇ °¡¸í °ø°ÝÀÌ ÇÑ°è¿¡ ºÒ°úÇÏ´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇß´Ù. ½ÇÁõÀû ³íÁõÀÇ ÀüÁ¦¸¦ µÞ¹ÞħÇÏ´Â ¿ø¸®¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ÀνÄÀ» ±Ù°Å·Î »ïÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¼ö¿ë °¡´ÉÇÑ ÀνķÐÀû ¼±ÅÃÀÌ ÀÖ´Â ÇÑ, ±×¸®°í ³ª´Â Á¸ÀçÇÑ´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇØ ¿Ô½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é ÀϺΠ½ÇÁõÀû ³íÁõÀº ½ÇÁ¦·Î ÀÚ¿¬ À̼º¿¡ ÀÇÇØ È®½ÇÇÏ°Ô ½ÅÀÇ Á¸À縦 Áõ¸íÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÚ¿¬ À̼ºÀÌ Á¦´ë·Î ÀÌÇصǴ ÇÑ). »ç½Ç, Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£ ÀÚ½ÅÀÌ ÀÌ°ÍÀ» °¡´ÉÇÏ°Ô ÇÏ´Â ÀνķÐÀû ±×¸²ÀÇ ÀϺΠÃø¸éÀ» ¹Þ¾Æµé¿´´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ ´Ù¸¥ °÷¿¡¼ ÁÖÀåµÇ¾î ¿Ô½À´Ï´Ù.
´õ¿íÀÌ Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£¿Í °¡Å縯 ÀüÅëÀº º¹ÀâÇÑ ³íÁõÀ» ¼ÒÈÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÅëÂû·ÂÀÌ ÀÖ´ÂÁö ¿©ºÎ¿¡ °ü°è¾øÀÌ ¸ðµç »ç¶÷ÀÌ ½ÅÀÇ Á¸Àç¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Áö½ÄÀ» ¾òÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â °¨°¢À» °øÀ¯ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸ÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ´º¸ÕÀÇ ¾ç½É ÀÌÇØ¿Í ¶ó³×ÀÇ ½Å¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÃÊ¿ùÀû Áö½Ä¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °³³ä¿¡¼ ãÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£ÀÇ ÀÛ¾÷ Ãø¸é°ú °ÇÑ À¯»çÁ¡ÀÌ ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ ¸ðµç °ÍÀº Çϳª´ÔÀÇ Æ¯º°ÇÑ °è½Ã¿Í´Â ÀüÇô ¹«°üÇÑ ÀÚ¿¬ÀûÀÎ Áö½ÄÀÎ °Íó·³ º¸ÀÔ´Ï´Ù. Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£¿Í °¡Å縯 ÀüÅëÀº ¶ÇÇÑ ¹«°ú½Ç ¹«½Å·Ð ¹®Á¦¿¡ °üÇØ »óÈ£ °ÈÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ƯÈ÷ µµ´öÀû ¾ç½ÉÀÇ ¸ñ¼Ò¸®¸¦ °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ ¸í½ÃÀûÀÎ ¹«½Å·Ð¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ¿© ¾Ï¹¬ÀûÀÎ À¯½Å·ÐÀ» À§ÇÑ ÀÚ¿øÀÌ µÎ °¡Áö ¸ðµÎ¿¡ ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. °Ô´Ù°¡, °¡Å縯 ÀüÅëÀÇ »çȸÀû ÁË Çö»óÀº ÀÌ ¹®Á¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£ÀÇ »ý°¢ÀÌ Áøº¸ÇßÀ½À» ³ªÅ¸³¾ ¼ö ÀÖÁö¸¸, Àΰ£ÀÇ Àý¸ÁÀ» Ž±¸ÇÏ´Â Å°¿¡¸£ÄÉ°í¸£ÀÇ ±íÀÌ´Â ¿ì¸®°¡ ¿¡¹Ý½º¸¦ µû¶ó "µ¿±âºÎ¿©µÈ ¹«½Å·Ð"À̶ó°í ºÎ¸¦ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â »ç·Ê¸¦ »ó»óÇÏ´Â µ¥ µµ¿òÀÌ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. µ¿±â°¡ ÀÌÇØ°¡ µÇ´Â °æ¿ìµµ ÀÖÁö¸¸, ±Ã±ØÀûÀ¸·Î 'º¯¸í'Àº ¾Æ´Õ´Ï´Ù.